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Private Sponsorship VS. 
Government Assistance 
A Summary of some findings of Employment and immigration Canada's Evaluation 
of the lndochinese Refugee Movement, 1979-80 
In 1979-80 Canadians privately spon- 
sored 35,899 Indochinese refugees to 
Canada. Another 25,978 came to Canada 
with government assistance. How have 
those refugees fared? How effective was 
private sponsorship compared to the 
traditional mode of government resettle- 
ment assitance? What is the future role of 
private sponsorship? 
Employment and Immigration Canada 
recently released the first three (of four) 
studies* evaluating the 1979-80 Indo- 
chinese refugee movement The release 
of the studies coincides with a dramatic 
decline in private sponsorships. Con- 
cerns about the inequities inherent in the 
dichotomy between private sponsorship 
and government assistance have been 
voicea. Further, the need to find the most 
efficient and effective modes of refugee 
resettlement in light of economjc con- 
straints has prompted calls for a new 
partnership between the government 
and private sectors for the sponsorship of 
refugees. The Inter-Church Committee 
for Refugees recently convened a study 
session in Kingston to work out some 
basic principles for a new sponsorship 
model which probably would combine 
government funds with private efforts. 
Employment and Immigration Canada's 
studies offer basic data from which to 
develop such new models. 
"The four studies are: 
(i) a review, based on a survey 
by mail, of the experiences and 
opinions of Canadians who private 
ly sponsored Indochinese refu- 
gees, prepared by the Program 
Evaluation Branch of Employment 
and Immigration Canada; 
(ii) an in-depth assessment of the 
Indochinese refugee group spon- 
sorship program, based on inten- 
sive interviews with selected church 
leaders, representatives of volun- 
tary agencies, and private sponsors 
of refugees, prepared by DPA 
Consulting Inc. in association with 
Mr. Maxwell Brem; 
(iii) a study of the impact of the 
Indochinese movement on Canada 
Immigration Centres (CIC) and 
Canada Employment Centres (CEC) 
based on interviews with staff, 
prepared by the Program Evalua- 
tion Branch of Employment and 
Immigration Canada; and 
(iv) a longitudinal study of the 
socio-economic adaptation of l nde  
chinese refugees a k t t e d  to Canada 
during 1979 and 1980, being pre- 
pared by a group of sociologists. 
Private sponsorship brings strong per- 
sonal support, knowledge of the commu- 
nity and networks of Canadian friends 
and acquaintances to refugee resettle- 
ment This human element obviously 
offers emotional advantages. It also has 
positive material consequences, evident 
in the critical area of employment. 
Employment 
Overall, 84.9% of the working age popu- 
lation of Indochinese refugees were 
participating in the ~anad ian  labour 
market by the time they had been in 
Canada 18 months. A very high propor- 
tion of Indochinese refugee women were 
working: 82.4%, compared to only 50.9% 
of all Canadian women This, the report 
suggests, reflects the need to have two 
incomes to make ends meet (Seventy- 
seven per cent of the refugees had an 
annual income of less than $10,000, while 
only 29.3% of Canadian families had an 
income of less than $11,000 in 1980.) 
There is another important difference 
between ~ndochinesekefu~ee and over- 
all Canadian labour force participation. 
Indochinese refugees 45 years old and 
over had a very high unemployment rate 
of 18.8%, compared to an unemployment 
rate for that same age group in Canada as 
a whole of only 5.1%. In contrast, Indo- 
chinese refugees between 15 and 24 had 
an unemployment rate of only 9.5% 
compared to an overall Canadian rate for 
that group of 15.3%. The most commonly 
cited reason for unemployment was lack 
of English or French. 
The unemployment rates of govern- 
ment-assisted and privately sponsored 
refugees were about the same, with the 
exception of some regional variations. (In 
Quebec, which resettled a higher propor- 
tion of government-assisted refugees to 
privately sponsored refugees than other 
provinces, government-assisted refugees 
had a higher unemployment rate than 
those who were privately sponsored. The 
reverse was true in British Columbia and 
the Yukon.) But the unemployment rates 
were the same for the two groups in spite 
of the fact that overall, government- 
assisted refugees were found to be more 
likely to have some knowledge of English 
or French than privately sponsored 
refugees. Therefore, the report concludes, 
private sponsorship per se has been a 
positive force in helping refugees find 
jobs. 
Forty-five per cent of privately sponsor- 
ed refugees had found jobs they had at 
the time of the survey through their 
sponsors. Both privately sponsored and 
government-assisted refugees had been 
expected to use Canada Employment 
Centres (CEC's) to find jobs. But many 
sponsors thought these services "needed 
improvemenf'. And government-assist- 
ed refugees have constituted as much as 
90% of the clientele of voluntary refugee 
aid agencies that provide direct services 
such as finding jobs or accommodation.' 
Also, privately sponsored refugees were 
somewhat more-likely to be working in 
occupations similar to their former ones, 
which may reflect the time sponsors were 
able to take to acquaint themselves with 
the refugees' backgrounds and, again, 
their ability to use personal contacts to 
help the refugees find suitable jobs. Only 
13.7% of government-assisted refugees 
and 17.7% of privately sponsored refu- 
gees were working in-the same occupa- 
tions they had had in Indochina, after 18 
months in Canada. Considering that all 
but 6.6% of the refugees previously held 
medium or high-skilled occupations, 
these statistics indicate that previous 
training is grossly underutilized. 
Finally, privately sponsored refugees 
also found their first jobs in Canada four 
weeks earlier than government-sponsored 
- - --- 
*It is worth noting that CEC staff felt that 
private agencies often found inappro- 
priate jobs for the refugees, such as 
seasonal jobs. Also, most agencies felt 
that privately sponsored refugees who 
had been here longer than one year (the 
length of the formal sponsorship com- 
mitment) were increasingly using their 
services. 
